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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
BEEHIVE SE:CURITY THRIFT & LOAN,
a U tab corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
JOHN T. HYDE and IviARY C. HYDE, his
wife, KERMIT R. ESKELSEN, LARSON
PAINTING COMPANY, and UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,

NO. 10232

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS JOHN T·. HYDE,
MARY C. HYDE and KERMIT R. ESKELSEN
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts
set forth in Appellant's brief, and for that reason Respondents make no separate statement of facts.
For the purpose of argument, Respondents will
consolidate their answers to Points I and II of Appellant's brief under Point I of Respondents' brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING
THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE SUED UPON IS
USURIO·US
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The-trial court, in its Conclusions of Law, concluded
as follows:
That the note sued upon is usurious and that
interest may not be charged by an industrial loan
company on a loan in excess of $5,000.00.''

"2.

Section 15-l-2, Utah Code Annotated/ 19531 as it
applies to this case provides as follows:
"The parties to any contract may agree in writing
for the payment of interest for the loan or forebearance of any money, goods or things in .action, not to
exceed ten per cent per annum; provided:
(a) That a loan or any renewal thereof except a
loan made under subsection (g) may specifically provide for a service charge, which charge shall not exceed four per cent of the principal sum of said loan;
such service charge shall not be subject to any additional charge or interest;

* * *
(f) that industrial loan corporations may contract
for and receive interest and charges at the rates subject to the limitations contained in chapter 8, Title
7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953;

(g) that any corporation, except small loan licensees,
operating under the supervision of the state banking
department of Uta;h, and any national bank or federal savings and loan association doing business in
the state may add to or deduct in advance from the
proceeds of any loan repayable in installments over
a period of not more than 63 months and not exceeding $5,000.00 in principal amount, interest or discount at a rate not ·exce·eding seven per cent per annum upon the principal amount of the loan for the
en tire period thereof; provided, however, such
amount added on or discounted shall be computed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
in accordance with rate· charges yielding the lender
interest which shall not exceed 14% per annum ..."
(Emphasis added.) .
.

.

'

I

It should be noted that Section 15-1-2, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, attempts to provide a comprehensive schedule of maximum rates that may be charged
as interest with respect to ariy.loan under any circumstances. However, it should also be noted that
the permissible interest rates vary, depending on
the amount loaned and the identity of the lender.
Thus, the statute permits anyone to charge up to ten
per cent per annum as interest, and it also contains
provisions which apply to industrial loan corporations, and other corporations supervised by the state
banking department.
Appellant in its brief asserts that the rate applicable to this transaction is subsection (f), which applies to industrial loan corporations. Respondents
submit however, that whether the lender is an industrial loan corporation or not, is a question of fact.
· Respondents respectfully submit that there is
no allegatlon in plaintiff's complaint, nor is there any
admission on the part of the defendants, offer of
proof by the Appella_nt, or any finding by the trial
court, that the Appellant is an industrial· loan corporation. Accordingly, the maximum interest rate allovrable would have been ten per cent per annum.
Since the note in question provided for an interest
rate in excess of nineteen per cent (19%) per annum,
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the .trial court' was justified ··iri::·1incllng . that the) not~;
was usurious. ·On ·this. :.·<Jroun?. ala~-~ the: trial court
should be sustained.
..~,/./;:c·..
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H6wever,·· e-~e!l-'if Appellant were an. industrial
loan corporation (which Respondents do not admit)/
the trial court was still_correct in concluding t}J.at the
note sued up<)!{ Was. usurib.{;_~~- ..: --~ :-.· . ...

'.

:

'

y-..

••

... ,

.

•

.

.

. _··

, -. • .

..:.

:;

..

·-..

.

.

-

Appellant takes great exception ·to that part of
the· Conclusions ·of Law,· which· states that interest
may not be charged by_ an industrial loan company
in excess of $5,000.00. ·Respondents believe that this
statement was inserted in the· Conclusions of Lavr
by Appellant as a straw-man._type issue. Respondents
have never contended that an industrial loan company cannot charge interest on a loan in excess of
$5,000.00. Thi3 real question involved here is: What
interest rate may be charged 'by an industrial loan
company,. or anyone else, on a loan ,in excess of
$5,000.00? .
·~
.
·..·
. .:·:.
-~~~~~~

:·~:s~.~-~~

on-·an.

Appellant in its brief lays great. emph~sis
.
opinion of, th~ Attorney Ge:qerql; but Appellanl has
cited only part of the opinion .. Ihei~~{:qf't4~e. ~pini6r1'
discloses that the Attorney. General's. ·opinion was
in response. to ·the q~esUon: ''Are. 'irt~dustrial loan
corporatiqns limited to loans of$-S,OQO.OO -rtiaxir,rium?'.'
.

.

.

·-

~

~

~

-;

~

. Th~ rea~ substance· of the· opinion of the Attorney
Gene·ral was that Sectiorts 15-1~2 and 7~-8-3, Utcili.Code
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Annotated, 1953, do not constitute a limitation o .1 the
maximum amount wh,ich may be loaned by an industrial loan corporation.
. Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
· ··
·
"Every industrial loan corporation shall have power:
(b) To charge interest for the full term of the loan
computed on the original amount of the loan (excluding charges) at the rate of l <J'o or less per month
on that part of the lo.an not in excess of $2,000.00 and
at the rate of 3/4 of l<J'o per month or less on that part
of the -loan in excess of $2,000.00, but not in excess
of $5,000.00, without regard to any requirement for
installment payments (subject to the refund for repayment in full as set forth in paragraph d)."

The words/ ''every industrial loan corporation
shall have power" (emphasis ·ours) a p p are n t 1y
caused the Utah State Banking Commissioner to
wonder whether an industrial loan corporation
could make a loan in excess of $5/000.00; hence the
request for the Attorney General's opinion. The Attorney General, however, reasoned that these words
should not be construed as a limitation on the
amount of money that an industrial loan corporation
could loan. Respondents. agree with this reasoning
up to this point. The Attorney General, however/
went further and reasoned that an industrial loan
corporation could charge the maximum rates specified in Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953/ on
amounts up to $5,000.00, and in addition thereto
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to

could charge 10% per :.a-nnum: pursuant
Sectioii
15-l-2, Utah Cod·e'-:Annotated}-1953, on ·all amounts
in ·excess of $5,000.00. ·R·esp.ondents respectfully dis:.
agree .with this ~part of the Attorney General's opin~
io.n. To allow such· a
would mean that-an in~
dustrialJoan corporation· making a·loan in exce·ss :of
$5,000.00. would :be· governed under Section--7~8-3,
Utah- Code.. Annotated, 1953~ as to ·patt ·of the ·loah,
and under. Section 15-1~2;: Utah· CodEr Arinot.ated.,
1953, :9-s to .the remainder of the loan~ Furthermore~
there.:vvo.uld,be no· apparent prohibition on charging
the··four . per cent service charge allowed by subsection (a) of Section 15-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

result

It ts clear that the statutes cited do provide maximum rates of interest that-may be charged, and that
Section 15~1-2 (g) at least does not apply to this case,.
because by its ·express terms it is limited to loans
not·exceeding-$5,000.00. Respondents further submit
that ··Section::· 15-1-2 (f), {which refers ·to Section
7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated~ 1'9,53) does not apply to
this transaction because it·rriakes··no··a.liowance- for
·cny interest to be charged on' ahy--loan=-in excess 'of
·SS.,OOO~OO. · .~.)~1..:. ·tri ~: ~, :··.:·
,

.......

.. ,,,.'

.........

/··

.
Respondentp submit that better reasoning would
ii1dicate that_ Sectiqn 15-·1~2,·· Utah Code Annotated;
:1953, . -~nd Settio~ 778-3,· ·utah code Annotat~d-, !'953,
o.r2 intended
p1'ovide_l5 for' ·:alternative rate~ rather
··tha·n supplementary· rates, and
- th·at unless a lender
..
can bring his loan entirely Within the-· provisions of

to

/
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Section 7-8-3, relating_to the, alternative rate, the maxF
rnum rate applicable to his -loan ·should be- the s~me
rate- which applies. to anyone else's who doesn't
qualify for alternativ~ rates; _that is,· that the m~ximum
rate on the entire loan. is 10% per' annum~ Thus, Respoii:¢ents submit that these. provisions, 'taken as a
whole,_ do not prohibit an industrial loan -corporation
or._anyone else from making a 1oan in excess of _$5,000.00; but the statute· does prohibit anyone, including industrial loan corporations, from charging more
than 10% per annum as interest ·for· the en.tire
amount of any loan if th·e loan exceeds the sum of
$5,000.00 .
. In the instant transaction, Beehive Security_ Thrift
& Loan made a loan to the _Hydes in: t4e amount of
$5,504.71 and charged inte-rest thereon in the amount
of $1,603.29 as add-on interest which constitutes an
interest rate in excess of 19% per annum. Consequently, Respondents submit that the trial court was
cl~arly co~ect in holp.ing th~t _the note sued upon i3
~surious. Respondents _s"t+bmit that that -part of _the
Conclusions of Law >No. 2_which states, "that interest
may not be charged by an industrial loan company
on a loan in excess of $5,000.00" is not really critical
to the decision; and pursuant to Rule 61, ·Utah· 'Rules
of CiyilProcequre,·if such a ruling constitutes error
it is only harmless. error and does. not constitute •?.
ground .for disturbi.n~- the judgment, and. should .be
disregard~d by this Honorabl~ Court. ·
. .. . . .
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TIIVJ~ FOR THE REC:QVERY."·· . OF . US·URJO-US INTEREST HAD NOT.
LAPs·E.n so A,S To :BAR, REsl>"oNDENT'S' co:uNTER-

POINT· \II. THE .STATUTORY
CLAIM

'.

· ·section· iS-l-7,· Utah Code :Artnotated, 1953, provides that 'th~- t~erson by:· whom a gtea.ter rate of iri- .
terest ha·s been paid :··:may· tecover back three times ·
the:'amount .. of interest thus paid·, together-with reasonable~ attorney's feE§s;·_ '-'provided ·th·at such action is
commenced 'Witbi:n:·.two ye·ars ·from the time the·
u:stirious transaction occurred.''.
-·The record-· 'Shows. ·that the subject transaction
occurred on·April18,·1961. The record further shows
that within two years thereafter (on approximately
F~brua~y 13, 1963) plaintiff commenced this action,
which was ··based upon. ·the same transaction. Respondents concede that defendants Hyde filed their
ar1:swer setting forth a claim for setoff by reason of
usu'rious transactio_n- in:ore'~: than·· tw.o ·years after the
transaction occurred; howe~er,:-respondents submit
that ·this· does ;not· bar defendants Hyde from asserting the defense of usury by·way of setoff a~d of obtaining the benefit of the full relief allowed by the
U$,Ury $tq.tu~e. . ··· . · .,._:
,,
... In t:he _case c;>f Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v.
Brady, 99 P.2d 97-(Ariz. 1940) the Supreme Court of
A:r:i~0na dec{qed th~t if a counte~claim or .setoff is not
b.~rJ-_e·d by the St~tut~ .of Li~itations at the.commence-.
m"ellt ofthe action in ~hi~h 'it is pleaded, it does
not
.
.

'
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bec6rrie 'so ~durin'c;r tne pende:hcy·~'of •'that action, al-.thoug4 the. stat'-ltdrY. periQd_··nlay-~ pave elapsed be:'r'
fore the filing of the answer-setting it up.
... Jn~the case. of Whittier· v. -Ylssch~r,: 189,Cc:Ll· 450,
209 Pac. 23, the Supreme. Court ofCal~f9rni~ l:J.<?ld. that
the~ authorities were ,agre?d J4at -if, a right of action
relied on as a counterclaiffi--·w~s.. a,live·.:at. ~e -~om.~
mencement of the suit the Statute of Limitations does.
not ru~ against it, even ~thougl}.the fuli st~tl1ior)r.pe~-
riod expires during the--pendency of the. acti~n _and_.
before the counterclaim is pleaded by filing the
counterclaim. (See also, to. the same effect: ..Union
Sugar Company v. Hollister Estate, 3 Cal. 2d.740, 47_·
P.2d 273-1935.)
·· ·
In the case of Zink v •. Zink, 5.6 Ind. App. 677, 106
N.E. 381 (1914) the Court said: ..

in

"A defendant_ may set up
a c_~oss-compl.a~nt a cause
of action which was· not- barred by· the Statute of
Limitations at ·th·e time the ·:plclintiff~s action was
._filedj and such cause of action cannot -become barred
.by .tpe s~~tute during. t~e p_en.dency,:of the plaintiff's
action."
_· _ ·' ,
· '-.
·
,_
!J

•

•

'

•

..

'

'

•

• _·,

~

In the case of Denton v. Detweiler, 48 Ida. ·369,
282 P~~· 82 (1929)~ the Su:preme _Court of Idah.o st9.ted
the general rule t''to be that: "The defense of the
Statute ~f Limitations is rt~t av~il~ble· againsf;a ooun~~
terclaim durfng the pendency .of the .action unless
the claim was barred when :''the a!ctiori was cdm~ ~
menced."
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10·.In .Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 55 S.Ct. 695,
79 -L.~d- 1421 it -~a9 _held t.hat although the Statute of
Limitations ·barred. the recovery back of a Federal
Estate. :rax erroneously assessed and paid, on the
theory that certain moneys receive'd by the executor- ·;of ·the ·d·ecedent' s estate was part of the corpus
of. the .estate··, ·.th·e estate ···was entitled··to have the
amount so paid credited on an income tax subsequ~ntly assessed in respect ·-of such moneys; and that
where the claim for refund was not barred at the time
the· Government proceeded against the Executor for
the collection of the income tax, such claim could be
asserted by. way of ·setoft although the statutory period had run before the attempt to do so was made.
: No recent cases were found with respect to this
matter, but respondents believe that this is because
the precedents are so well established that there is
practically no other view. ·The precedence is so
qncient that we h~ve .even found one English case
decided in 1797, which holds this view. See Ord v.
Ruspini, 170 Eng" Reprint 458. in which it was held
that where · there · were· cross demands between
plaintiff and defendant which accrued at the same
.~irne,_and both of which~wov-ld have been barred by
the Statute of Limitations .had not the plaintiff saved
the
status· of his demand by commencing an action,
-.
the defendant might set off his demand even though
he did not file his answer unfil after the statutorv
time would have run.
.

.

J,
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As applied to thi~ caser it wo1-1ld seem· therefore
that by .way of offset defendants Hyde ~re_~ntitled
to the relief allowed .under the. Usury _Statute, by_
reason of the fact that the. ;plaintiff's compla~n~ was
filed within two years of the time the usurious trans.action occurred, even.. though ~aid._ answer. was not.
filed until after the. two years had passecf
·.
CONCLUSION
.

•.

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully submit that the trial cou~t did not err in holding;
and finding that the note. sued upon is usurious and
that Respondents are entitled to the credits and off-:
sets which were allowed by the trial court, by reason
of which this Honorable· Court should sustain the
judgment of the trial court. ·
Respectfully submitted,

J.

REED TUFT
53 East Fourth :S·outh
Salt Lake City,.·Utah ·

Attorney for Respondents John T.·
Hyde and Mary C. Hyde
JOHN G. MARSHALL
53 East Fourth South
Salt Lake- City, Utah

Attorpey for Respondent Kermit R.
Eskelsen
··
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